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The Development of the Law pertaining to
Contracts

the

of Married Women.

Chapter

1.

INTRODUCTION

Scarcely any other branch of the law has received
so much and so careful attention in the adjuaications of
the courts of both England and America in
as that

which relates

ples which have

to the married woman.

best interests

The princi-

apparently controlled in the development

of this branch of jurisprudence
deemed to be

modern times

are those which have been

for her protection and welfare and for
of the family,which

she

the

has helped to

create.
It
courts,

is

interesting

to note

in

the decisions of' the

the influence which the growth in

civilization

of the English people has had upon the reasoning of the
judges.

We find even in

the common law courts how en-

croachments, slight at first but continued

through

successive generations, have modified to some extent,the
more inequitable provisions

of the law of married wonen.

But thd most beneficent tribunal
the English speaking people,

in

in

the early history

remedying faults

of

and amel-

iorating rigorous conditions of firmly established and
unbending

principles of law, was the court of Equity;

the rise of which as a system was stranuously opposed by
the common law courts for many centuries and was not finally recognized as having an equal footing until the
reign of James 11.
to find the real

To this court, then, must we look

oeginning of the work of the emancipa-

tion of the married woman from the disabilities of coverture.
In the more recent years of the developement of
this law in

both England and America,

there has been

another agency which has been instrumental
greater

changes since about

the middle

in

effecting

of the present

century, when its aid was, almost for the first time,
invoked, than had been accomplished during all the centuries gone before.

This agency is the legislature;

supreme in England and second only to the people

in the

United States.
The sources,

then,

of the law of married women

from which we shall draw in this examination are,

(1)

the common law, (2) equity, (3) legislative enactments.

Chapter

1I.

Doctrine of Identity or Unity.

At common law the wife had no legal existence.
identity was merged in that of her husband;
under his power and authority;

incapable

Her

she was

of contracting,

of bringing an action in her own name, or of securing
any standing whatever in

any case whe"r

it

to resort to law to have a right enforced;

was necessary
neither

could she enjoy the rents and profits of her real estate;
nor hold or receive personal property, for marriage per
se acted as a transfer to the husband, of choses in possession immediately and choses in action as soon as reduced to possession.

The situation has been well

expressed by Schouler ( Domestic Relations Sec.

5

),

thus "husband and wife are one person and that one is
the huab and."
When the theory of unity originated in England
it

is

impossible to discover.

A careful

examination of

the authorities discloses the fact that it did not exist
to the same extent before the Conquest that it did after
that time.

Miller says

in his

"History of the Anglo-

Saxons", that "women could hold and convey land without
the consent of their
charters;"

husbands

and we find

and also witness deeds and

a confirmatory

statement by

Turner in his History of the Anglo-Saxons, as follows:
"that the Anglo-Saxon ladies both inherited and disposed
of

property as they pleased, appears from many instances;

a wife is mentioned who devised land by her will with
the

consent of her husband in his lifetime."

Still the

very fact that she devised land with the consent of her
husband is evidence that she had not the same
in law as her husband;

and a further

recognition

indication is

found in the manner of forming the marriage relation.

The contract of marriage was, in the Anglo-Saxon
law, similar to contract of sale, not of the person of
the woman but of the guardianship;
this

law,

for women, under

were under the guardianship

usually of their

father,

until

of some person,

they were married,

then

it. became their husband's right by reason of his having
purchased its

The husband as guardian became possessor

with his wife of her property;

but neither could with-

out the others consent alienate it;
not liable

for the wife's debts.

ly disabled.
been stated,

On the
that

contrary,

she was able to

degree of independence;
supposes the ability

it

and the husband was
But she was not total-

follows from what has
contract with some

for the existence

to contract

them,

of debts pre-

and if

her hus-

band was not liable, her creditors must have been able
to enforce collection of them against her during coverture.

We conclude, therefore, that she obtained great-

er recognition during this early period than under the
common law of the later period.
state

However, the exact

of the law of married women at this

time,

owing

to the primitive and crude condition of all

branches of

the government and the lack of writers to preserve
history, must

it as

remain largely a matter of speculation.

From what source the theory of unity originated is
equally as much a matter of speculation as the time when
it originated;

can reach a more logical

but one

con-

clusion in the case of the former than of the latter
Until within the last

half

century,

history

does

not disclose to us any nation in which the married woman
occupied other than a position of servitude, subordination or, at least, of legal inferiority, less in degree
as civilization advances.

Even among the Romans, where

we find the nearest approach to equality, there were restrictions

on her ability

property.

Owing to

to contract and alienate her

the small regard for the marriage tie,

which existed among this

people,

it

is

not strange

wives were not placed under greater disability.

that
If one

can judge at this distant day from the records of that
time he

is forced to the conclusion that the relation was

entered into rather as a matter of convenience than as

an obligation.

For example, Jerome tells us of having

seen a husband bury his twenty second wife and he was
her twenty first husband;

and another case is mentioned

where a woman had eight husbands in five years.

Even

under this condition of the marital relation, if it can
be so called, the husband was entitled to the use of his
wife's property, though he could neither alienate nor
mortgage it.
Though Blackstone says that

"the wife's disabili-

ties are deemed for the most part intended for her protection and benefit, so great a favorite is the female
sex of the laws of England, it can not be asserted that
the doctrin had its origin in so commendable a purpose.
The most probably theory is that the unity of husband
and wife did not become fully recognized as a matter of
law, until after the introduction of Christianity into
England.
that the

The

earliest works and decisions

idea was obtained from the

indicate

"inspired word."

An anonymous author of a book entitled "The Lawes Resolutions of Woemeda

Rights or the Lawes Provisions for

Woeme4,"

who wrote in th, early part of tht

century says,

"In the second chapter" (

seventeath

of Genesis

)

"Moses declareth and expresseth the creation of woman
which word in good sense signifieth not the woe of man,
as

some affirm, but with man;

for so in our hasty pro-

nunciation we turn the preposition with to woe or wde,
oftentimes;

and so she was ordained to be with man aa

a heIp and a companion, because God saw that it was not
good that man should be

alone.

Then when God brought

woman to man to be named by him, he found straightway
that she was bone of hia bones, and flesh of his flesh,
giving her a name, testifying she was taken out of man,
and he

so pronounced that for her sake man should leave

father and mother and adhere to his wife which should
be with him one."
"Now, because Adam hath so pronounced that man
and wife shall be

but one flush,

and our law is that a

feoffment be made jointly to John at Stile and to Thomas
Noke and his wife, of three acres of land, that Thomas
and his wife get no more

but one acre and a half, quia

una persona,

-

-

-

-

for

th3v are but one person and by

this a married woman perhaps may either doubt whether
she be either none or no more than half a person."

In

a case decided in the fifteenth year of Charles 11
(Manby v Scott i
says;

Modern Rep. 124

) Hyde, in the opinion

"In the beginning when God created woman an help

meet for man he said "they

twain shall be one flesh;'

and thereupon our law says that husband and wife are but
one person in law;
upon woman was

presently after the judgnent of God

'thy desire shall be to thy husband, for

thy will shall be subject to thy husband and he
rule over thee.'
potestate viri
habeat,

Hereupon our law put the wife suband says quod ipsa potestatem sui non

sed vir suus and she is disabled to make any

grant, contract, or bargain without the
consent

shall

of her husband."

among the Romans.

The

allowance or

sane idea prevailed

These are evidences which, in the

absence of actual knowledge of the source of the doctrine, can not be easily rebutted.
Having the theory of identity

or unity established,

matters not,

how or when it

it becomes necessary

to as-

certain to what extent it affects the contracts of marand the statutory

ried woman in law and in equity;

changes which have been made in the state of New York.

Chapter
The

of

Contracts

111.

Married

of unity in

The fiction
was not limited in

its

Woman

at

application,

was not applied were exceptional
extended not

Law.

the law of married women
but,

it was almost absolutely maintained.

It

Common

on the contrary,

Cases where it

and comparatively few.

only to contracts,

property and torts,

but it also affected her criminal responsibility by introducing presumptions.
It is fundemental in the law of contracts that
there must be at least two parties to ever-Y contract;
and two parties capable of contracting.
woman under the disability of coverture

Therefore,

could not, under

this theorybe a competent party to an agreement.
contemplation

a

of law she has no existence.

In

It was merged

in

not like

most contracts

but while

that

of her husband.

and lost

Her contracts were

of an infant,

voidable

only,

they remained unexecuted on her part they were

absolutelv void;

and as they did not bind her, they

could not be enforced against the party contracting with
her.

It

is,

therefore,

evident

that coverture

greater disability than infancy.
ratification

after

the disability

The

ried woman could not do;

infant could,

ceases,

absolutely liable on his contracts;

was a
by

make himself

but this the mar-

she could only bind herself by

entering into a new contract thereafter.

The reason for

this is better understood by adverting to the different
grounds of their disabilities.

The former resta upon

the ground that the infant is incapable of contracting
by reason of its immature age, and it is therefore, for
hie protection against fraud, undue influence &c.,

while

the latter rests upon the legal fiction of identity of
husband and wife and the consequent
authority vested in

the husoand

She could not be

sole and superior

(Neef v Re&mon 76 M 195)

bound by her own contracts,

neither was

on a contract in which

she personally liable

she joined with ber husband;

such as a j-romisory note,

a bond under seal, or a covenant in a deed of real property;

nor could she become a surety either for her

husband or for any other person; nor bind herself in any
manner where it was necessary to resort to a court of
law to enforce the obligation.

She was disabled from

alienating her land by deed either by uniting with her
husband or by separate conveyance.

The only way in

which she had power to transfer her title or interest in
real estate was by levying a fine or suffering a recovery.

Such total incapacity hardly warrants the

pression of Blackstone

that the female sex is

ex-

"so great

a favorite"of the laws of England.
The recognized injustice of this excessive restriction led to numerous exceptions.
disability of coverture

It removed the

in cases where the husband waE

civiliter mortuus. or banished after conviction for some
crime, or where he had of his own accord abjured the
realm.

Also a woman who had married an alien residing

in another country, was exempted from this disability.
not,

Another exception may be mentioned,

in

either

and contract

also by the "custom of London"

thereto;

relation

trade or business

of

agree-

or poanuptial

by anteauptial

ment carry on a separate
in

with the consent

England a married woman could,

her husband

From an early time

of the husband.

from any disability

arising

however,

she

without regard the consent of

had the same privilege

her husband, and herein she could be
oned for debt without her husband,

arrested and impris-

and also might be

declared a bankr-'pt.
Chapter

Contracts

The

&f

the

Married

Woman

in

Equity.

inflexibility of the common law made it impos-

sible to obtain complete
quently appeals were
bound by its
numerous

IV.

rigid

the

in

often made

principles.

that the king

authority to

justice

many cases,

to the king,
These

conse-

who was not

cases became so

was obliged to delegate this

chancellor;

and out of this beginning

14
grew the Court of Equity which has
to

the jurisprudence

of the

English speaking people.

Although the principles
nized, and in certain cases
exclusively considered.

contributed so largely

of law are

fully recog-

enforced, yet they are not

Equity has always recognized

the duality of husband and wife for many purposes, and
has

enabled the wife to have a separate estate and to

contract with her husband

or any other person,

and be sued in relation thereto.
present

or to sue

The subject of our

inquiry is with reference to her ability to

enter into contracts enforceable in the Equity courts.
By the general

rules of law applicable

to married

women, all contracts entered into between husband and
wife before marriage became extinguished by the matrimonial union, except that, in the case of a bond given
by the husband to the

wife and made payable

after

the

death of the husband, she might enforce collection of it
out of his estate.

But courts of Equity, notwithstand-

ing the

"equity follows the law", will in

maxim that

certain cases enforce such contracts and give effect to

the intention of the parties as expressed

contracts made in contemplation of marriage

Nevertheless,
will not be

gation,

therein.

enforced against the wife as a personal

obli-

but only against the property to which such conEquity, therefore, recognizes the

tracts relate.
arate existence

sep-

of husband and wife sufficiently to valbut it acts only upon the thing of

idate the contract;

to wit,

its own creation:

the wife's separate estate.

Anti-nuptial agreements were, however, construed
very strictly
Equity.

and would not be
For example, an

extended by a

agreement that a wife might

dispose of her personal property ad libitum,
was an expressed

court of

intention to extend it

unless there

to personal

property received after marriage, would only apply to
property which shj had at the time of marriage
ham v

Cuthbertson
The agreement

husband after

2

Brown's appeal cases 7

(Pilking)

of a married woman made with her

marriage,

whereby, she acquired the

right

to receive and hold property bequeathed to her, was, in
equity,

as binding upon both parties

thereto as though

made before marriage.

Even when the agreement was

that the husband should give to his wife property to be
held as her separate estate,
force it,

equity would uphold and en-

if it were not made in fraud of creditors.

But it is probable that this

rule did not apply where

he attempted to give her his entire estate.
The separate estate of a married woman might be
settled upon her either orally,

if it

consisted entirely

of personal property, or by written instrument;

and it

might be done either before or after marriage.

As a

general rule she might dispose of both real and personal
estate,

either by will or otherwise, as though she were

a feme

sole,

unless there was some restriction in the

instrument by which the estate was created.

It was for-

merly doubted whether a wife could dispose of her real
estate where the settlement,

trust or power was created

before marriage, but rested only in an agreement between
the husband and wife without the interposition of a trust
In regard to this, Lord Hardwicke said in the case of
Peacock v Monk ( 2 Vesey 191

);

"Agreement for settling

estates to the separate use of the wife on marriage are
very frequent, relating both to real and personal estate.
As to personal; undoubtedly where there is an agreement
between husband and wife before marriage,
shall have her separate use,

that the wife

either the whole or par-

ticular parts, she may dispose of it by an act in her
life or will.

She may do it by either, though nothing

is said of the manner
a much stronger ground

of disposing of it.

in that case, than there can

be in the case of real estate;

because that is to take

effect during the life of the husband;
band survives he is

But there is

for if the hus-

entitled to the whole;

and none can

come into a share with the husband on the statute of
distributions.

Then, such an agreement binds and bars

the husband, arkd consequently bars everybody.
is

very different as to real estate;

But it

for her real es-

tate will descend to her heir-at-law, and that more or
less beneficially;
curtesy,
it

for the husband may be tenant by the

if they have issue, otherwise not.

descends to her heir-at-law.

But still

Undoubtedly, on her

marriage, a woman may take such a method that she may
dispose of that real estate from going to the heir-at-law;
that is,

she may do it without a fine.

But I doubt

whether it can be done but by way of trust
over an use."

or of power

The doubt which existed in the mind of

Lord Hardwicke seems to have been caused by the different
rules under which the law disposed of her real estate
and personal property;

the former descended to her heirs

and the latter was not disposed of according to

the

statute of distributions, but went to her husband by
virtue of the right to administer upon her estate, which
was given him by statute

Charles 11, 22 and 23;

but

) that

"it

was not needed to give the right to husbands, for

the

waa said in Wilson v Drake

(2 Mod. Rep. 20

it

husband and wife are but one person in law and this act
provides

'for the settling intestate estates;' now the

wife can not be said to die
(the

intestate, when her husband

better half) survives."
This doubt has, however, been removed and the

doctrine was firmly ebtablished in New York by the

decisions in Bradish v Gibbs ( 3 John Ch. 523 ) that,
in such a case, a court

of equity will compel tho heir

to convey her real estate to the iperson to whom she has
made disposition, making the heir a trastee of her
donee or vendee until this is

done.

Where the power rests upon a postnuptial agreement
between the husband and wife, the situation is different.
It will be upheld in equity as to the husoand, but not
as to others whose legal rights wuuld thereoy be infringed or destroyed.

If

the husband were legally entitled

to both real and personal property,
no difference whether it was
nuptial agreement;

then it

antenuptial

woila mte
or a post-

but he is entitled only to the

personal property, as above stated, therefore it is void
as to her real

estate only.

entirely on the change in

And this distinction

the legal

rests

capacity of the

woman occasioned by marriage.
The English doctrine, prior to modern legislative
enactments, seems

to have been that a married woman had

an unlimited power over her separate estate, to mortgage,

charge, or dispose of it;
ticular provision

unless restrained by some par-

in the instrument creating it.

A

particular mode of disposition pointed out in the instrument would not, however, prevent the disposition of
it

in

another manner,

ly prohibited.
tory, that it

unless any other mode was express-

But the English cases are so contradic-

is difficult to determine just what the

settled rule really was.
ever,

The

courts of New York, how-

followed the doctrine stated above

Jaques vs

in

the case

Trustees M. E. Church ( 17 John, 548

subsequent cases until

of

) and in

the necessity was taken away by

act of the legislature.
As a corollary

to the

femt

covert's right of

disposition, she may enter into contracts with reference
to her separate estate.
otherwise.

At an early period it was

The English Courts of Equity for a long

time

refused to permit a married woman having a separate estate to contract debts to be charged upon it.

But the

injustice of allowing her to enjoy such estate after she
had contracted debts on the faith of it,

and the

inconvenience whicei she suffered in not being able

to

find credit, when sh-. intended to deal fairly, became
apparent;

so that courts finally permitted her to

change her separate estate byr at1orili instrument
seal.

As to the creation of this

cellor, in the case of Vaughan v
179 says;

under

new power the ChanVandergastegen 2 Drew,

"Although from an early period Courts of Equity

had so far departed from the settled rules of law ,vizft
respect to feme covert, as to admit of property being
settled in trust for her separate use, and had established the principle that, with respect to the property so
settled, she should ba considered a feme

sole,

quoad

the capacity of enjoying and the capacity of disposing
of that property, it is remarkable how long and steady
they refused to grant to her the other capacity of a
feme sole, that of contracting debts.

It might very

reasonably be considered that consistency required that
she should have the capacity to the same limited extent
to which she was constituted a feme sole;

although to

have extended her capacity of contracting debts beyond

that limit would have been clearly a violation of all
principle.

But so deeply were Courts of Equity im-

pressed with the propriety of adhering to the
law by which a married woman is incapable
debt, that they would not recognize

rule of

of contracting

in her the capacity

of doing so at all, not even to the same limited extent
to which they had constituted her a feme sole.
time, however, being pressed by the

After a

injustice of allow-

ing her, after having deliberately and solemnly entered
into an engagement for the payment of money, to continue
in the enjoyment of her separate property without paying
her creditors, the Courts at first ventured so far as to
hold, that if she made a contract for payment of money
by written instrument with a certain degree of formality
and solemnity, as by a bond under her hand and seal,

in

that case the property settled to her separate use should
be made liable

to the payment

of it.

refused to extend the rule to less

"

Still the courts

formal

instrunents.

They were unwilling to regard a bond under seal as a
debt,

but invented other reasons

to justify

the apjlication

of the separate estate to their payment.

But once un-

lock the door and some one will find an occasion to
open it.

No court can safely intrench itself behind

an unlocked door.

One departure in the right direction

leads to another, so, in the course of time,

1,romisory

notes, bills of exchange and finally written instruments
in general were brought under the same rule.

It came

to pass, therefore, that to charge the married woman's
separate estate, it was only necessary to ascertain her
intention.

The Chancellor in the case of Murray v

Barlee ( 3 Mikl & K

210 ) said,

"her intention is

re-

garded, and the Court only required to oe satisfied
that she intended to deal with ner separate property.
When she appeared to have done so,
to have charged it,

the Court held her

and made the trustees answer the

demand thus created against it.

"

Chapter V.

Contracts of Mvlarriud Women under the New York

As before stated Equity was first
time

in

Statutes.

order

of

in abating the rigor of the cormon law applicable
of coverture;

to women under the disability

and it

may

be regarded as the forerunner of the legislation by which
so many changes have been everywhere effected, most of
all

perhaps

in

the state

of New York.
The legislature

Sovereignty is supreme.

of each

state of the American Republic is sovereign, limited
only by

its own Constitution, the Constitution of the

United States and the franchise
boundaries.

of the people

within its

It was possible for it to overturn com-

pletely what equity could only evade in certain cases.
Therefore, it must necessarily stand first in the extent

and effectiveness
This state

of its

work.

was, perhaps, in the early years of

its existence the most undeviating follower of the common law relative

to married women;

even excepting

them from the operation of statutes, which,

otherwise,

by implication might have been held to refer to them.
an act passed in

For example,

1787

entitled

"An act for

Settling Intestate Estates, proving Wills and granting
Administrations" provided that
else

therein contained respecting

intestate

estates

estate
that

"This act nor anything
the

of

shall be construed to extend to the

of feme coverts

that shall

die incestate,

but

their husbands may demand and have administration
rights,

of their

credits

and other personal

before

the passing of this

estate,

and

ab they might have

recover and enjoy the same as fully
done

distribution

act."

The same session of the legislature also enacted
that a woman covert could not make a valid will or teatament

of any lands,

tenants or hereditiments

rents,

issues and profits

or of the

therefrom.

As jreviously stated, at common law the wife could
neither

by joining with her husband nor by separate

strument
she

convey her real

could convey it

estate.

The

onl-

mode in

inwhich

was by uniting with her husband in

levying a fine;

but an act passed in

1801

(R.

L.

369)

enabled her to execute a deed, requiring, however, that
she

should acknowledge

before a projer officer,

from her husband that she executed
fear or compulsion of' her husband.

apart

such deed without
By virtue of

this

act the same result was obtained as was formerly accompliahed by a fine;

it facilitates, rather then enlarges

her power.
No further act
womentwas pasaed until
utes in 1330.

affecting th-. rights

of married

the adoltion of the Revised

Although by the law

of 1787 the married

woman was precluded from making any will of r6al
she still had the right
but this privilege the

Sut-

estate,

to bequeath her personal property
I Revised Statutes touo

away;

so

rill

of

that from 1830 to 1849 she could not dispose by
either

real or personal

did not

affect her power of appointment which was ex-

ercised by an instrument

propertyT.

in

This,

the nature

of course,

of a will,

in

cases where that right wab given her by antenuptial
agreement;

and it seems also that, during this period

with the assent of her husband,

she could,
of personal

property.

a will

was undoubtedly

This distinction

based upon the ground that,

make

since the husband was the

only person interested in the wife's personal estate,

it

was proper to allow her to make a will witia his consent.
By Chapter 80 of the Laws of 1840 the right was
given to the married woman to insure

for her own benefit and to preserve

husband

free from the claims of his creditors.
a

slight

privilege,

her legal
known in

status -

marks

of her

the life

the proceeds
though but

This,

the beginning of a new era in

the recognition of rights

never before

the laws of England or America.

Chapter 11 of the Laws of 1845 enabled a married
woman to take out a patent on her own invention and to
receive the

benefits and profits

therefrom, and to trans-

fer and dispose of the same and perform all acts in relation

thereto in

the same manner as though she were

single.
Although
of this

new era,

the year 1840 really
but slight

marks the

beginning

changes were made prior

to

The legislature of that year,

1848.

Section 1, transformed her equitable

by Chapter 200,

into a legal estate

and declared that all property which she should thereafter

receive she should hold as her own legal

estate,

and the same should not be subject to the claims
creditors

of her husband.

Section 2 of this act provides
personal

property,

and the

rents,

that "The

issuee

thereof, of any female now married, shalto

of the

the disposal of her husband;

but shall

real

and

and profits
not be subject
be her sole

and separate property as if sne were a single female
except

so far as the same may be liable for the debts of

her husband heretofore contracted."
held to

be unconstitutional for the reason that it at-

tempted to take away the
had in hi

vested right which the husband

wife's property by virtue of the common law

(White v White, 4 How. Pr.,
The
shall
grant,

This section was

102)

third section of this act provides that

be lawful

for any married female

"It

to receive by gift,

divise or bequest from any person other than her

husband and hold to her sole and separate use as if she
were

a single

female,

real and personal

property,

and

the rents, issues and profits thereof, and the same
not be subject

to the disposal

shall

of her husband nor be

liable for his debts."
This act,

while

it gave her the right

and hold property as a legal
any disposition of it;

estate,

to receive

did not provide

for

consequently she was under as

great a disability in disposing of it or in making a contract

in

regard

to

sage of the act.
disability,

it,

to the pas-

The legislature of 1849 removed the

however,

Chapter 375,

as at any time prior

by the enactment

which provides

take by inheritance, or by

of Section 1,

that "Any married female may
gift, grant, devise or be-

quest from any person other than her husband and hold to
her sole and separate use and convey and devise real and
personal

property,

and the rents,

and any interest

issues and profits

manner and with like effect
and the same

shall not be

as if
subject

or estate
thereof,

therein,
in

the same

she were unmarried,
to the disposal

of her

30
husband nor be liable

for his debts;"

thus giving her

the additional right to receive property by inheritance,
as well as by gift, grant, divise and bequest, and to
diepose of

it ad libitum;

the husband not even being

required to join in a deed conveying her real property.
Although the law of 1830, taking away the right of the
married woman to will her personal property, was not
expressly repealed until 1867,
act of 1830 a mere

nullity, as

the act of 1849 made the
it also did the law of

1787 preventing her from mking a will

of real estate

any interest therein, and gave the power

to will

or

it as

well as to contract in relation thereto.
But the disability of coverture was removed only
so far as property rights were

concerned;

neither the

act of 1849 nor any legislation prior thereto, enabled
her to bind herself personally apart therefrom.

This

was, accomplished by later legislation.
As before

stated, a married woman could carry on

a trade or business;
or by the

but only with her husband's

"custom of London."

In this

state

consent

Chapter 90

of the Laws of 1860 provided that she could do this in
her

individual capacity without the consent of her

husband.

It also enabled her to perform any labor or

services on her sole and separate account, and to retain
the earnings therefrom as her role and separate estate.
Still she was bound only by contracts relating to such
trade or business.
The third section of this act took a step backward.

Since the law of 1849, previously referred to, a

married woman

had been able, not only to

receive and

hold real and personal property, bout also to dispose of
either or both in whatever manner she pleased;
section took away
real estate without

entirel , her right to

but this

dispose of her

the consent of her hu4band.

The

object of this retrogressive step was, undoubtedly, the
preservation of his right of

crtesy, which now zould

only be lost by his consent, thus placing dower and
curtesy on an equal footing.

This

remained in force but two years.

section, however,

It was then amended by

Section 1 Chapter 172 of the Laws of 1862, which restored

to her the right of disposition and the right to enter
into contracts in relation to her real estate with
like

the

effect in all respects as if she were unmarried. "
Chapter 300 of the Laws of 1878, Section 1, gave

to a married woman, resident of this
twenty-one years of age,

state and over

the power to "execute, acknowl-

edge and deliver her power of attorney with like fo rce
and effect, and in the same manner as if she were a
single woman."

As she had not been able

generally at that time,
as she had, viz:

the

to contract

she could confer only such power

power to contract in relation to

her separate estate or her trade or business.
It was not until 1884 that the old equity rule,
previously adopted by the legislature of this state, was
departed from.

Legislation had followed in the foot-

steps of equity in nearly every case, if
The

legislature

not invariably.

of 1884 made an innovation by passing a

law (Chapter 381 Section 1

) enabling a married woman

contract "to the same extent, with like effect and in
the same fonm as if

unmarried and she and her separate

to

estate

shall

be liable thereon,

to her separate

relates

whether such contract

business or estate or otherwise,

no case shall a charge upon her separate estate

and in

be necessary. "

With but one exception she could now

contract generally and bind herself personally.

This

exception was created by the second section of the same
act and reads as follows:

"This act shall not affect

nor apply to any contract that shall be
husband

and wife."

Nevertheless she could contract to

the same extent as her husband, so
equal
by

footing.

made between

that they were on an

But this last restriction was removed

the Laws of 1892,

Chapter 594,

which provides

that

"A married woman may contract with her husband or any
other person,
in

the same form as if

ate estate
tract

to the same

shall

relates

complete

be liable

no case

be necessary."

the

coverture.

unmarried,

with like

effect,

and

and she and her separ-

thereon,

whether such

con-

to her separate business or estate or

otherwise and in
ate estate

extent,

work

shall a

charge

This is

upon her separ-

the last

statute

of emancipation from disabilities

to
of

"so great a favorite

truth of the statement,

The

is the female

sex of the law,"

can not now be questioned.

The law found the married woman in

a condition of legal

subordination to her husband, and has placed her on a
plane of equality with him.

within the

Every barrier

power of legislation to remove, has disappeared before
its onward progress.
if

not of political

She now breaths
liberty.

In

the air of legal

some things she is

more highly favored than her companion of thtv sterner
sex.

( also the unmarried woman

She

from arrest,
comnitted

) is

in many cases where her husoand would be

to the goal.

Her dower in

his

be barred without her consent, while she
her real

privileged

lands can not
can dispose of

estate and effectually cut off the

curtesy

interest to which her husband would otherwise be entitled
The

great work

of emancipation which has been

accomplished by the New York legislature with the last
fifty years, must always be regarded as one of the best
indications of the civilization of our time.

"There

is

nothing, I think, which marks more decidedly the character

they
of men or of nations, than the manner in which
treat women."
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